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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
000OOO000 
SUSAN NEWELL BALDWIN, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
WILLIAM ANDREW BALDWIN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
000OOO000 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
the provisions of § 78-2a-3(2) (i) of the Utah Code and Rules 3 and 
4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Does the failure of the Appellant to properly 
marshal the evidence which supports the decision of the trial court 
in this matter preclude this court from granting the relief 
requested? Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P. 2d 818, 820 (Utah App. 
1992) . 
2. When the trial court applying legally appropriate 
1 
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criteria, properly awarded custody of the minor children of the 
parties to Mrs. Baldwin, did the court abuse its discretion? This 
decision is subject to the standard of review that: 
"Trial courts are given broad discretion in making child 
custody awards." Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P. 2d 922, 923 (Utah 
App. 1992). "The trial court's decision regarding 
custody will not be upset 'absent (a showing of an abuse 
of discretion or manifest injustice.'" Id. (quoting 
Mauahan v. Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App. 1989). 
"'We give great deference to the trial court's findings 
of fact and do not overturn them unless they are clearly 
erroneous.'" Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah App. 
1989). "'However, to ensure the court acted within its 
broad discretion, the facts and reasons for the court's 
decision must be set forth fully in appropriate findings 
and conclusions. Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, at 923 -
924 (Utah App. 1992) . (Quoting Painter v. Painter, 752 
P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1988)." 
Tucker v. Tucker, 881 P.2d 948, 951 (Utah App. 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
1. Section 30-3-10 Utah Code Annotated: 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor 
children are separated, or their marriage is 
declared void or dissolved, the court shall 
make an order for the future care and custody 
of the minor children as it considers 
appropriate. In determining custody, the 
court shall consider the best interests of the 
child and the past conduct and demonstrated 
moral standards of each of the parties. The 
court may inquire of the children and take 
into consideration the children's desires 
regarding the future custody, but the 
expressed desires are not controlling and the 
court may determine the children's custody 
otherwise. 
(2) In awarding the custody, the court 
shall consider, among other factors the court 
finds relevant, which parent is most likely to 
act in the best interests of the child, 
including allowing the child frequent and 
continuing contact with the noncustodial 
parent as the court finds appropriate. 
2 
2. Rule 4-903 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
Intent: 
To establish uniform guidelines for the 
preparation of custody evaluations. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the district and 
juvenile courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Custody evaluations shall be 
performed by persons with the following 
minimum qualifications: 
(A) Social work evaluations shall be 
performed by social workers licensed by the 
state in which they practice. 
(B) Psychological evaluations shall be 
performed by psychologists licensed by the 
state in which they practice. 
(C) Psychiatric examinations shall be 
performed by a licensed physician with a 
specialty in psychiatry. 
(2) In divorce cases, one evaluator shall perform the 
evaluation on both parties and shall submit a written 
report to the court, unless one of the prospective 
custodians resides outside of the jurisdiction of the 
court. In those cases, two individual evaluators may be 
appointed. The evaluators must confer prior to the 
commencement of the evaluation to establish appropriate 
guidelines and criteria and shall submit only one joint 
report to the Court. 
(3) Evaluators must consider and respond to 
each of the following factors: 
(A) the child's preference; 
(B) the benefit of keeping siblings 
together; 
(C) the relative strength of the 
child's bond with one or both of the 
prospective custodians; 
(D) the general interest in 
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continuing previously determined 
custody arrangements where the child 
is happy and well adjusted; 
(E) factors relating to the 
prospective custodians' character or 
status or their capacity or 
willingness to function as parents, 
including: 
(i) moral character and emotional 
stability; 
(ii) duration and depth of desire for 
custody; 
(iii) ability to provide personal rather than 
surrogate care; 
(iv) significant impairment of ability to 
function as a parent through drug 
abuse,excessive drinking or other causes; 
(v) reasons for having relinquished custody in the 
past; 
(vi) religious compatibility with the child; 
(vii) kinship, including in extraordinary 
circumstances stepparent status; 
(viii) financial condition; and 
(ix) evidence of abuse of the subject 
child, another child, or spouse; and 
(F) any other factors deemed important by the 
evaluator, the parties, or the court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Dr. Andrew Baldwin (hereinafter referred to as "Andrew") 
presents no challenge to the sufficiency of the findings of the 
court to support the award of custody of the children to Mrs. Susan 
Baldwin (hereinafter referred to as "Susan"). He challenges the 
findings themselves. In his Brief he cites extensively to the 
record asserting evidence that supports his challenge to the trial 
court's Findings, however he fails to marshall the evidence which 
supported the Findings and rulings of the trial court. In doing so 
he fails to meet his burden in this Court to properly present his 
appeal. Crockett v. Crockett,83 6 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah App. 1992), 
Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Utah App. 1991). 
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The parties were married on the 18th day of September, 
1987, in Las Vegas, Nevada (R.2, 79, 2432-33) . Three children were 
born of the marriage: William, born May 23, 1988; Barbara, born 
July 31, 1991; and Andy born June 29, 1992. (R. 2, 79, 2485). 
Susan was the primary caretaker of the three minor children 
throughout the marriage of the parties. (R. 1479). She was the 
exclusive caretaker of Will from his birth until Barbara's birth on 
July 31, 1991. (R. 1479). Shortly after Barbara's birth when she 
discovered she was pregnant for a third time, Susan insisted Andrew 
begin providing some care for Will. (R. 1479). While Andrew 
provided some physical care for Will in terms of playing with him 
and taking him with him for various activities, he did not perform 
any of the other child care duties, such as cooking, cleaning, 
purchasing, clothing or food, performing household chores, taking 
the children to medical appointments or other daily activities 
involved in child care. Susan provided all of these services for 
all three children and Andrew at no time provided care for either 
Barbara or Andrew. (R. [Susan] 2491 - 95, 2496 - 2509, 2513 - 17, 
2559 - 60, 2579-80, 2593-2600, 2864-66, 2867-68, 3103-07. [Dr. 
Stewart] 2361-63, 2593, 3103. [Andrew] 2952-56). 
Shortly after each of the children was born, Andrew 
departed leaving Susan and the infant to pursue other activities. 
Susan felt abandoned and forced to cope with the problems of a new 
child and, after Barbara's birth, with the other children above. 
(R. 1480) . This occurred despite the fact that the children were 
delivered by caesarean section and the date that this would be 
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performed, was known in advance. (R. 1480) . Andrew put pursuit of 
his own interests ahead of those of providing care for the children 
or assisting the mother. (R. [Dr. Stewart] 2317-18, 2361-63, 2412. 
[Susan] 2496-2509, 2643-46, 2652-53, 2867-68. [Andrew] 2935-42, 
3020-21, 3370.) 
Susan is a nurse. She went back to work after the birth 
of her children. She arranged her shifts so as to be available for 
the family. (R. 1480, 2486-87, 2491-95, 2864-66). While the 
divorce was pending, Andrew frequently changed visits as he 
accepted work assignments around the country and while in court was 
unable to identify a future work schedule. He stated his work 
schedule was unpredictable, and the court found his theoretical 
ability to provide personal care was accordingly questionable. (R. 
[Dr. Stewart] 2264-65, 2359. [Susan] 2504-09, 2577-79, 2593-2600, 
2724-25, 2867-68, 2882-83. [Andrew] 2952-56, 3029-30, 3346-51, 
3370.) 
The court, after argument on September 8, 1992 (R. 177) 
awarded temporary custody of the children to Susan. (R. 182-186). 
Andrew objected. (R.213-215, 405-416). The court affirmed the 
Commissioner's Recommendation on November 24, 1992. (R. 436, 453-
54) . A custody evaluation was then performed by Dr. Elizabeth 
Stewart (Exhibit "l"). Dr. Stewart recommended custody be awarded 
to Susan (Exhibit "1"). 
At the time of the final pretrial of this matter on 
October 6, 1993, the trial court asked counsel for Andrew if he 
desired to have another custody evaluation performed. Counsel for 
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Susan stated that he would agree to such a second opinion, provided 
that Dr. Stewart would be again permitted to examine the parties 
and the children, and update her recommendation. Andrew declined 
to have further evaluations requested that the matter go forward to 
trial. (R. 1097, 1263, 2213). 
As part of performing her evaluation, Dr. Stewart had 
each of the parties take a Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory ("MMPI"). She found that Andrew's MMPI profile was 
inconsistent with the interview that she conducted with him. 
Consequently, she determined that his MMPI profile should not be 
used in evaluating him. (R. 2303, 3087-89). Andrew challenged 
this determination through the testimony of Dr. Donald Strassberg. 
However, Dr. Strassberg did not evaluate either Susan or Andrew (R. 
3155). Over the objection that he had inadequate foundation to do 
so, Dr. Strassberg was allowed to testify about the tests (R. 3157) 
and the court heard his opinion (R. 3161-63, 3165-79). In cross-
examination, Dr. Strassberg admitted that the MMPI tests are not 
perfect (R. 3180) and it is possible to manipulate them (R. 3174-
75) . He also testified that he has done custody evaluations and 
could not base a custody recommendation on the tests alone (R. 
3180) . Finally, he declared that he, himself, had no basis for 
giving an opinion regarding custody. (R. 3180) . 
Interestingly enough, Dr. Strassberg testified that he 
may have recommended to the father that he obtain another 
evaluation (R. 3184) . If so, that was advice that was not 
followed. 
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During trial, the court found Andrew's actions, though he 
was both a lawyer admitted to practice in California and a 
physician (R. 36) with experience in psychiatry (R. 36) required 
admonitions to keep himself under control. (R. 3287). Andrew, 
feeling that the court's findings in this regard were exaggerated, 
fails to reveal to this court that the trial court held several 
side bar conferences and both before and after recesses, advised 
counsel for Andrew that Andrew needed to be under more control. 
The side bar conferences were not recorded, but occurred (R. 23 64, 
32 99) and an exchange between the court and Andrew, while he was 
testifying, demonstrates some of the difficulty with which the 
court was coping. (R. 3363-64) . The observations of the court in 
this regard, were similar to those of Dr. Stewart. (R. 2260-61, 
2269-72, 2276-77, 2288, 2293-96, 2318-19, 2321-23, 2324, 2342-45, 
2378-79, 2382, 2409-11, 2416-17, 3094-99, 3102-03, 3131-36). 
The court was advised by Dr. Stewart that she becomes 
very concerned when finding that one parent attempts to alienate 
the children from the other parent and she found evidence that 
Andrew was attempting to alienate Will from Susan. (R. 2261-63, 
2265-68, 2277-82, 2321-23, 2324, 3098-99, 3102-03). 
Andrew acted in ways that caused high stress to Susan and 
children without apparently seeming to reflect on the damage that 
he was inflicting. The 911 tape was considered to be a compelling 
example of this by the court. (Exhibit 31.) 
Andrew acknowledged that Susan had done a very good job 
of parenting under difficult circumstances (R. 3371-72) and that 
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Susan had been flexible regarding visitation. (R. 3022, 3375-36). 
Dr. Stewart confirmed that this was her finding as well (R. 2351-
52) . 
It was Dr. Stewart's observation that while Andrew played 
with the children, that was different from providing care and a 
structure in which they would properly function. She testified 
that had he provided a structure with limits, such as Susan did, he 
would have encountered more difficulty with the children. (R. 
2261-63, 2269-72, 2276-77, 2277-82, 2293-96, 2356-57, 2378-79, 
2382, 3103-08) . 
Until the time of trial, Andrew's position was that he 
wanted custody of only the older child, Will, and that custody of 
the younger two children, Barbara and Andy should be awarded to 
Susan, (R. 34, 43, 53, 58-59, 74, 117-18, 135-36, 146-49, 182-84, 
221-22, 2172-73) . Andrew testified on January 10, 1994 that in 
reality he wanted Susan to raise all the children until they 
started school and then have the children spend the school year 
with him and the off time with her. (R. 3213-14, 3343-44) . 
Susan became concerned about Will's conduct and sought to 
have his misconduct diagnosed. It was found that he was 
hyperactive. Andrew refused to accept this diagnosis and expended 
substantial efforts at trial trying to prove that Will's difficulty 
was not hyperactivity. Judge Lewis advised Andrew that she was not 
going to make a determination as to Will's medical condition, the 
issue was one of whether or not one or both of the parents were 
unwilling to comply with the recommendations of medical care 
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providers. (R. 2855). In that context, the evidence demonstrated 
that Andrew refused to accept the diagnosis. (R. [Dr. Stewart] 
2270-75, 2318-21, 2323, 3107-08/ [Dr. Goldsmith] 2435-47, 2462-64, 
2468-75, 2477-79, 2481-82; [Susan] 2487-89, 2580-84; [Dr. Francis 
Burger] 2895-2906; [Andrew] 3204-09) . 
After hearing six (6) days of testimony, the trial court 
ruled that custody of the three minor children of the parties, all 
preschoolers, should be awarded to their mother, Susan. (R. 1277-
1291) . The court accepted the testimony of the custody evaluator, 
Dr. Elizabeth Stewart and found that Susan had been the primary 
caregiver to the children throughout their lives and was more 
emotionally stable and capable of providing a stable home for the 
children than was Andrew. (R. 1277-1291, 1478-95). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. AFTER CONSIDERING FACTORS REQUIRED BY § 30-3-
10 OF THE UTAH CODE AND THE APPLICABLE UTAH 
APPELLATE DECISIONS, JUDGE LEWIS AWARDED 
CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN OF THE PARTIES 
TO SUSAN, A DECISION WHICH ANDREW HAS APPEALED 
TO THIS COURT. 
1. Andrew fails to marshall the evidence supporting the 
findings of the trial court and thus fails to properly present his 
appeal to this court. This failure precludes this court from 
granting the relief requested. Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P. 2d 818, 
820 (Utah App. 1992); Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1308 
(Utah App. 1991). 
2. The Utah Supreme Court in Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 
117 (Utah 1987) ruled that in deciding custody the trial court 
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should examine function related factors and award custody based on 
who has carried out the parenting function. This court in Moon v. 
Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 1990), and Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 
922 (Utah App. 1992) elaborated on the Pusey criteria and the 
factors articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Hutchison v. 
Hutchison, 649 P. 2d 38 (Utah 1982) as the other criteria which 
should be considered. In an attempt to focus the custody 
evaluators to consider these critical custody factors, the Utah 
Judicial Council published Rule 4-903 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration to guide custody evaluators. Dr. Stewart framed her 
report on the factors articulated in Rule 4-903 and her written 
report was accepted by the court as Exhibit "1". The trial court 
appropriately considered all of these factors and acted within its 
discretion when it awarded custody to Susan. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ANDREW FAILS TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE IN 
PRESENTING HIS APPEAL TO THE COURT AND HIS 
APPEAL SHOULD BE REJECTED. 
This court has articulated the following test for 
appellants challenging factual findings of a trial court: 
In challenging Findings, the Appellant: 
must marshall all evidence in favor 
of the facts as found by the trial 
court and then demonstrate that even 
reviewing the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the court below, 
the evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings of fact. If 
the Appellant fails to marshall the 
evidence, the appellate court 
assumes the record supports the 
findings of the trial court and 
proceeds to review the accuracy of 
the lower court's conclusions of law 
and the application of that law in 
the case. 
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 
1991) (citations omitted). 
Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d at 1308. 
Examination of Andrew's brief demonstrates that each of 
the findings from Finding 5 through 25 is examined. All but two 
are challenged. A citation to the record is purportedly made as to 
that evidence Andrew believes supports the ruling. It is not 
discussed. No effort is made to show why that evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the ultimate finding. Andrew simply states 
where he feels a challenge exists. He makes no effort to marshall 
and present the evidence that supported the court's finding. 
The marshalling rule was adopted so that there would be 
an understanding by both the appellant and the Appellate Court as 
to what evidence exists in support of a ruling by the court. This 
is required so that the Appellate Court is not put in the position 
of simply retrying the case without seeing or hearing the 
witnesses. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in a similar case, 
Nilson v. Nilson. 652 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1982): 
... this court is reluctant to reconsider evidence that 
a trial court is in an advantaged position to weigh. Our 
removal from the participants in a trial puts us in the 
disadvantaged position of reviewing testimony from a cold 
record. On review, we cannot judge the intonation of 
voice, or the manner and demeanor of witnesses as the 
trial judge is able to do. 
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652 P.2d at 1324-1324.x Andrew has simply attempted to retry and 
re-argue the matter to this court. Rather than marshalling the 
evidence that supported the trial court's conclusion, he has down-
played it or made it difficult to find. By arguing the evidence 
that was not accepted by the trial court, he asks this Court to 
reject the findings of the trial court without marshalling the 
evidence which supports those findings. He only marshals that 
evidence which is contrary to the challenged findings. This is a 
procedure which this court has unequivocally ruled is 
inappropriate. In doing so, he has failed to properly present his 
appeal and this Court should "assume[] that the record supports the 
findings of the trial court..." Procon Corp. v. Utah Dept. of 
Transportation, 876 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah App. 1994). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION BY 
AWARDING CUSTODY TO SUSAN CORRECTLY APPLYING 
THE GOVERNING LEGAL CRITERIA. 
If this Court overlooks the procedural defect of Andrew's 
failure to properly marshal the facts in support of the trial 
court's findings, there was ample evidence presented during trial 
which demonstrates the propriety of that decision. 
Recognizing that custody is a painful, difficult 
1
 See also Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 495 
(Utah App. 1994): 
Callahan does not properly attack the findings of the 
trial court on that issue. He attempts to draw our 
attention to the testimony of witnesses, which tends to 
be contrary to the findings, and he conveniently ignores 
the testimony of witnesses that support the findings. 
Callahan ignores his affirmative duty to properly attack 
the findings by marshalling the evidence. Because of 
Callahan's failure to marshal the evidence, we assume the 
record supports the findings of the trial court. 
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decision, Utah appellate courts have articulated a cognizable, 
basis on which custody decisions should be made. This commenced 
with the decision of Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986) in 
which the Utah Supreme Court ruled that there was to be no gender 
bias in custody determinations, and then declared the basic 
governing rule for deciding custody cases in Utah. 
We believe that the choice in competing child 
custody claims should instead be based on 
function-related factors. Prominent among 
these, though not exclusive, is the identity 
of the primary caretaker during the marriage. 
Other factors should include the identity of 
the parent with greater flexibility to provide 
personal care for the child, and the identity 
of the parent with whom the child has spent 
most of his or her time, pending the custody 
determination, if that period has been 
lengthy. Another important factor should be 
the stability of the environment provided by 
each parent. 
Id. at 120. In the instant matter the trial court entered 
extensive findings, numbers 5-25 of which demonstrate a careful 
examination of each of these factors. (R. 1478-95) . They reveal 
that the trial court carefully considered the criteria articulated 
by the Supreme Court and this Court is reaching an appropriate 
decision to award custody to Susan. 
After the Pusey decision, this Court has taken two 
opportunities to provide further guidance to counsel and trial 
courts as to the appropriate criteria that should be applied in 
custody decisions. In Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 1990), 
this Court, interpreting and applying § 30-3-10 of the Utah Code 
stated: 
...Case law has fleshed out the 'best 
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interest' criterion to include the following 
factors: 
The need for stability in custodial 
relationship and environment; maintaining an 
existing primary custodial bond; the relative 
strength of parental bonds; the relative 
abilities of the parents to provide care, 
supervision, and a suitable environment for 
the children and to meet the needs of the 
children; preference of a child able to 
evaluate the custody question; the benefits of 
keeping siblings together, enabling sibling 
bonds to form; the character and emotional 
stability of the custodian; and the desire for 
custody; the apparent commitment of the 
proposed custodian to parenting. 
These factors are highly personal and 
individual, and do not lend themselves to the 
means of generalization employed in other 
areas of the law, such as quantification in 
money. 
Id. at 54. The Court noted in a footnote to this quote that the 
list is not exhaustive and in making it the Court did not prescribe 
consideration of any of the enumerated set of concepts. 
In Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922 (Utah App. 1992) this 
Court declared: 
[4] There is no definitive checklist of 
factors to be used for determining custody 
since such 'factors are highly personal and 
individual, and do not lend themselves to the 
means of generalization employed in other 
areas of the law....' Moon v. Moon, 790- P.2d 
52, 54 (Utah App. 1990). The trial court 
must, however, make adequate findings 
regarding the 'best interests of the child and 
the past conduct and demonstrated moral 
standards of each of the parties.' Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-10 (1) (1989) . The court must also 
consider best interests of the child, 
including allowing the child frequent and 
continuing contact with the noncustodial 
parent as the § 30-3-10(2) (1989) . In order to 
determine the best interests of the child the 
court should also consider and, where 
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applicable, make appropriate findings on the 
following factors: 
[T] he preference of the child; 
keeping siblings together; the 
relative strength of the child's 
bond with one or both of the 
prospective custodians; and, in 
appropriate cases, the general 
interest in continuing previously 
determined custody arrangements 
where the child is happy and well 
adjusted. 
In a prior decision, the Supreme Court in Hutchison v. 
Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982) stated the courts should also 
consider, where applicable, the following factors relating to the 
prospective custodians: 
[M]oral character and emotional 
stability; duration and depth of desire for 
custody; ability to provide personal rather 
than surrogate care; significant impairment of 
ability to function as a parent through drug 
abuse, excessive drinking, or other cause; 
reasons for having relinquished custody in the 
past; religious compatibility with the child; 
kinship, including, in extraordinary 
circumstances, stepparent status; and 
financial condition. 
649 P.2d at 41. 
In an effort to provide information to the court that 
will demonstrate examination and evaluation of these factors, the 
Judicial Council published Rule 4-903 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration to serve as a guideline to custody evaluators as to 
how their evaluations are to be conducted and presented to the 
trial court. Examination of Exhibit 1 reveals that Dr. Stewart 
followed the criteria articulated by Rule 4-903 in presenting her 
findings and recommendations to the court. 
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All of the criteria of Rule 4-903 were correctly 
considered by Dr. Stewart. Findings 5 through 25 demonstrate the 
trial court's determinations followed the statutory and appellate 
court directives. Each factor on which evidence was available was 
examined and an appropriate finding was made. (R. 1478-1495). 
These findings have been challenged by Andrew but he fails to 
marshall fully the testimony which supported each of these 
findings. Despite Andrew's failure, Susan will marshal that 
evidence as well as respond to the challenges presented. A review 
of the evidence and law demonstrates that the trial court acted 
properly in this case. 
Finding of Fact No. 5 provides: 
Susan Baldwin has been the primary caretaker of the three 
minor children throughout the marriage of the parties. She 
was the exclusive caretaker of Will from his birth until 
Barbara's birth on July 31, 1991. Shortly after Barbara's 
birth when the Plaintiff discovered she was pregnant for a 
third time, Defendant, at Plaintiff's insistence began 
providing some care for Will. While the Defendant provided 
physical care for Will in terms of playing with him and taking 
him with him for various activities, he did not perform any 
other child care duties, such as cooking, cleaning, purchasing 
clothing or food, household chores, taking the children to 
medical appointments or other daily activities involved in 
child care. The Plaintiff provided all of these services for 
all three children. The Defendant at no time provided care 
for either Barbara or Andrew. 
This Finding was supported by the testimony of Susan Baldwin, (R. 
2491-95, 2496-2509, 2513-17, 2559-60, 2579-80, 2593-2600, 2864-66, 
2867-68, 3103-07); Dr. Elizabeth Stewart, (R. 2361-63, 2593, 3103); 
and Andrew Baldwin (R. 2952-56) . While Andrew states that the 
evidence was conflicting, he fails to set forth any basis on which 
the trial court abused its discretion in choosing to accept the 
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testimony of Susan, Dr. Stewart, and himself in support of this 
finding vis-a-vis the evidence which is generally alleged but not 
articulated which is contrary to this Finding. The Utah Supreme 
Court has made it clear that it is "the prerogative of the court to 
choose which testimony it would believe." Sweeney v. Happy Valley, 
Inc., 417 P.2d 126, 130 (Utah 1966) . Andrew's challenge on appeal 
ignores the trial court's decision to believe testimony contrary to 
his position. 
In addition, examination of Andrew's record cites 
demonstrate that he did not cite to the Court all evidence 
supporting the finding of the trial court. (Compare Susan's cites 
with Andrew's cites). In making this challenge, Andrew fails to 
deal with the fact that the trial court hears conflicting evidence 
and must determine which is credible and should be accepted. 
Yelderman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983), Nilson v. 
Nilson, 652 P.2d 1323, 1324-25 (Utah 1982). In his challenge to 
this finding and each of those hereinafter discussed, he makes this 
same failure. Abuse of discretion is not demonstrated by believing 
one witness instead of another. 
Finding number 6 was not disputed. It is supported by 
the testimony of both Dr. Stewart (R. 22 93-96) and Andrew (R. 2 958-
61) . 
Finding number 7: 
After each of the children was born, Will in 1988, 
Barbara in 1991, Andrew in June of 1992, the Defendant 
left town leaving the Plaintiff to cope by herself with 
the problems of a new child, and after Barbara's birth, 
with children who were already residing in the home. 
This occurred despite the fact that the date of each 
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child's birth was known in advance. The Defendant put 
pursuit of his own interests ahead of those of providing 
care for the children (William, or William and Barbara) 
when Barbara and Andrew were born. 
This Finding is supported by the testimony of Dr. Stewart (R. 2317-
18, 2361-63, 2367, 2412, 2414-15), Susan (R. 2496-2509, 2643-46, 
2652-53, 2867-68), and Andrew (R. 2935-42, 3020-31, 3370). The 
only apparent challenge to this finding is the declaration that 
there is nothing to support the finding that Susan was left to cope 
with a new born child by herself. No dispute is made of the fact 
that the evidence was clear that Andrew left town after the birth 
of each of the three children. Susan, after undergoing a caesarean 
delivery, had to deal with a new baby and then with a new baby and 
other children. The issue not discussed is whether because there 
were other people present to help Susan, should she not have felt 
abandoned by Andrew. The evidence is undisputed that he left Susan 
shortly after each child was born and she felt abandoned when he 
did this. There simply can be no credible challenge to this 
Finding. 
Finding number 8 is supported not only by the record 
references cited by Andrew, but additionally by Susan's testimony 
(R. 2491-95, 2557-60, 2864-66). No contrary evidence is cited. 
Finding number 9 is not disputed. It is supported by 
Susan's testimony (R. 2486-87, 2491-95, 2864-66). 
Finding number 10, which is challenged in part by Andrew 
provides: 
Defendant has never provided personal care for 
Barbara and Andrew for longer than a weekend which 
occurred during the pendency of this matter. In 
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addition, Defendant has, during the pendency of this 
matter, frequently charged his visits as he accepted work 
assignments around the country. He was unable to 
identify a future work schedule in court. He stated it 
would be unpredictable. Consequently, Defendant's 
theoretical ability to provide personal care is 
questionable. 
This Finding is supported by Exhibit "1", and the testimony of Dr. 
Stewart (R. 2264-65, 2359), Susan (R. 2504-09, 2577-79, 2593-2600, 
2724-25, 2867-68, 2882-83), and Andrew (R. 2952-56-3029-30, 3346-
51, 3370) . 
Andrew tries to explain, and in part dispute, Finding 
number 11: 
The Defendant has never provided personal care for 
Barbara or Andrew while the Plaintiff has regularly 
scheduled her shifts to provide custodial care for 
all three children. During the pendency of the matter 
the Defendant would not accept regularly scheduled 
visitation because he declared his work prohibited him 
from doing so. His uncertain and irregular schedule with 
unpredictable times in which to provide personal care is 
a pattern that continued throughout the pendency of this 
action. In addition, the Plaintiff testified that when 
he had personal time free during the course of 
the marriage, while the parties resided together, 
Defendant frequently used this for research and writing 
rather than providing care for the children. The 
Defendant did not dispute this testimony regarding his 
use of his time. 
However, he does not fully articulate and recite the basis upon 
which it is supported. It is supported by Exhibit "1", the 
testimony of Dr. Stewart (R. 2264-65), Susan (R. 2491-95, 2504-09, 
2552-54 (Exhibit "14"), 2556-60, 2577-79, 2593-2600, 2724-25, 2864-
66, 2867-68), and Andrew (R. 2952-56, 3346-52, 3370). 
Andrew then examines the essence of Findings 5-11 and 
concedes that they constitute findings which support a conclusion 
by the court that Susan was the primary caretaker of the children. 
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Andrew declares that the evidence was conflicting on this point. 
If the evidence is truly conflicting, then the trial court rejected 
his evidence and accepted that presented by Susan. This is the 
function of the trial court. Yelderman v. Yelderman, supra, Nilson 
v. Nilson, supra.; Sweeny, supra.. 
If the evidence is conflicting, Andrew must show some 
abuse by the court in making this determination. The citations to 
the record presented by Susan in this Brief show that they are 
rationally based on the evidence presented. That is precisely 
what the trial court is to do. Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P. 2d at 924, 
Martinez v. Martinez, 728 P.2d 994, (Utah 1986) . No abuse of 
discretion is demonstrated by the trial court's accepting the 
evidence which supports its finding, and rejecting the evidence 
which does not. Yelderman v. Yelderman, supra, Nilson v. Nilson, 
supra. Apparently, Andrew believes that anything he said or 
presented had to be believed, while that offered by Susan had to be 
rejected if they conflicted. That is not the rule by which either 
this Court or the trial court functions. Yelderman v. Yelderman, 
supra, Nilson v. Nilson, supra. The trial court must make 
rationally based findings from the evidence presented. The record 
references recited in support of each of the challenged portions of 
every finding, reflect the trial court properly carried out this 
function. Andrew fails to recognize that simply because he offered 
evidence which is not accepted, does not mean the trial court has 
abused its discretion in not accepting or finding credible his 
evidence as opposed to Susan's evidence. As the Utah Supreme Court 
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stated in Yelderman v. Yelderman, supra: 
The weight and credibility of the 
witness, including expert testimony . . . are 
matters to be determined by the trier of fact. 
669 P.2d at 408. 
Finding 12 provides: 
In determining the stability of the environment provided 
by each parent, the Plaintiff is clearly capable of supplying 
a much more stable environment than is the Defendant. Dr. 
Elizabeth Stewart, the only mental health professional who 
examined both the parties and their children on behalf of the 
court, was clear and unequivocal in testifying that it was the 
Plaintiff who could provide a stable, emotional environment 
for the children, not the Defendant. The behavior of the 
parties in the court during the trial confirmed the 
information provided by Dr. Stewart. The Plaintiff remained 
calm and provided information for the court. The Defendant 
became highly agitated and had difficulty keeping himself 
under control. On occasion the court had to admonish him or 
request the assistance of his counsel in keeping the Defendant 
under control so that the proceedings could continue. The 
Plaintiff presented non-accusatory information to the court 
about the experiences and parenting of the parties. The 
Defendant was accusatory and attacked the Defendant. In 
addition, the psychological testing of the parties, as 
described by the mental health professionals, as well as the 
clinical observations by Dr. Stewart indicated that while 
people and relationships are important to the Plaintiff, 
impersonal ideas are important to the Defendant. The children 
must be raised in an environment where they and their 
relationships to their parents, their peers, their families 
and each other are important. The Plaintiff is the parent who 
can create an environment in which these will be emphasized, 
maintained and taught. These are extremely important in the 
emotional stability of the environment maintained for the 
children. A custodial parent must provide comfort and 
security for a child and by personal care and using friends in 
a social environment, the Plaintiff has given the children an 
environment of adult caring. The Defendant did not provide 
such an environment and is unable to do so. 
This Finding is upheld by substantially more evidence than is 
acknowledged by Andrew. It is supported not only by Exhibit "1", 
but by the testimony of Dr. Stewart (R. 2260-61, 2269-72, 2276-77, 
2288, 2293-96, 2318-19, 2321-23, 2324, 2342-45, 2378-79, 2382, 
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2409-11, 2416-17, 3094-99, 3102-03, 3131-36), by the admonition of 
Andrew by the court during court (R. 3287) by the exchange between 
the court and Andrew (R. 3363-64) and by the two side bar 
conferences (R. 2364, 3299). Andrew fails to admit that not only 
in the side bar conferences (off the record) but on several 
occasions at recesses or at the conclusion of a session when 
counsel approached the bench (off the record), the court advised 
counsel for Andrew that his behavior was inappropriate and needed 
to be controlled. It was only on the last day of trial that Judge 
Lewis was so exasperated by Andrew's conduct that she made the on 
the record admonition (R. 3287). 
In addition, this finding is supported by the testimony 
of Dr. Goldsmith (R. 2444-46-2461, 2470-73), Susan and 
interestingly enough, Andrew who admitted he had told Dr. Stewart, 
that Susan had done a good job of parenting under difficult 
circumstances (R. 3371-72). 
In the course of the challenge to this Finding, Andrew 
asserts that the report by Dr. Stewart is stale. He does not 
acknowledge that at the final pretrial conference on October 6, 
1993, a few days before the trial started he was offered the 
opportunity to have another evaluation done, and/or an update by 
Dr. Stewart completed. An opportunity he rejected. Andrew 
determined to go forward with the trial without the offered second 
opinion or update by Dr. Stewart. In addition, Dr. Strassberg 
testified that he may have recommended to the Andrew that he seek 
another evaluation. (R. 3184) and if so, that was advice 
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deliberately rejected by Andrew who now seeks to challenge Dr. 
Stewart's report on the basis of staleness. Andrew, having waived 
an updated evaluation now attempts to use his waiver as a basis for 
an attack on the evidence. 
Andrew also challenges Dr. Stewart's reliance on the 
Rotter Sentence Completion Test but offered no evidence as to why 
she should not have done so. The results of these tests were 
admitted before the court as Exhibits 41 and 42. The testimony of 
Dr. Stewart explained the use of these tests and why they supported 
the findings she made. (R. 3089 - 3091) . Dr. Susan Mirrow, an 
expert witness offered by Andrew, testified that use of the Rotter 
Sentence Completion Test was the type of projective tests she 
thought should be utilized. (R. 2787, 2790) . 
Andrew asserts the court's adoption of Dr. Stewart's 
conclusion "reflects a conscious disregard of the evidence flatly 
contradicting her assessment." (Appellant's Brief page 21.) He 
fails to understand that if the trial court finds in the exercise 
of its discretion that this is credible evidence, it should be 
accepted and adopted. Sweeney, supra.. The fact that Andrew 
offered conflicting evidence, does not mean the court has to accept 
his evidence as opposed to contrary evidence. Yelderman v. 
Yelderman, supra, Nilson v. Nilson, supra. 
Andrew challenges the court's decisions regarding the 
MMPI evidence. Dr. Stewart, in fact, did make use of the MMPI test 
results, but not in a way that Andrew accepts. He believes his 
assertions must be accepted. The trial court's function is to 
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determine what is correct in an appropriate exercise of its 
discretion. Simply rejecting the father's evidence and accepting 
the mother's does not make it wrong. Ye1derman v. Ye1derman, 
supra, Nilson v. Nilson, supra. Dr. Stewart testified that 
Andrew's MMPI profile was inconsistent with his interview. She 
either had to assume the interview information and observations 
which she made in person were incorrect or the test was incorrect. 
It was her decision that the test was in error. She believed that 
Andrew had taken the test with the intention of down playing some 
of the significant items in it and she utilized that as one of the 
factors on which she formulated her ultimate opinions. (R. 2303, 
3087-3089) . Dr. Stewart recognized that Andrew had taken this test 
before (R. 2308, 3240) . Dr. Stewart explained her use of an MMPI 
in a custody case, (R. 3099-3101). She testified it is not to be 
used by itself. Thus, the challenge presented by Dr. Strassberg to 
her interpretation was misplaced. 
This is underscored by the fact that Dr. Strassberg did 
not actually interview or see either Susan or Andrew (R. 3155) and 
he was allowed to testify about the test profiles over the 
objection that he lacked foundation because he had not seen either 
of the people (R. 3155-59, 3164). The court did hear his opinion 
over the same objection (R. 3161-63, 3165-79) . The court noted, as 
Andrew has not, that the objection raised issues of weight and 
credibility, not admissability. On cross-examination, Dr. 
Strassberg testified that the tests can miss (R. 3180) and he would 
not base a custody recommendation on the tests alone (R. 3180) . He 
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declared that he had no basis for giving a custody opinion based on 
the tests. (R. 3180) . He did admit that it is possible, though 
difficult, to manipulate MMPI tests. (R. 3174-75) . On this 
conflicting evidence the court found against Andrew, properly 
fulfilling the duty doing what it was directed to do by the Supreme 
Court, Yelderman v. Yelderman, supra, Nilson v. Nilson, supra. No 
abuse of discretion or error in judgment is demonstrated by Andrew. 
In sum, no evidence was given that Dr. Stewart made any 
error in rejecting an MMPI test that was inconsistent with the 
clinical observations that she had made. In addition, she found 
that Andrew said he was depressed (R. 3112-3118) and that this did 
not show up on his MMPI profile. 
One of the unspoken critical issues at this point becomes 
Andrew's credibility. Could he or did he manipulate these results? 
In considering this question and the validity of Dr. Stewart's 
action, the trial court appropriately considered Andrew's testimony 
and demeanor. He is an attorney. He was present at the hearing 
held in regard to the Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show 
Cause in September of 1992. He knew that he had been ordered not 
to dissipate assets, yet he dissipated $94,500.00 worth of assets 
during the pendency of the action. (R. 3368-69). He testified 
that even though he was aware of the Order, he utilized the funds. 
(R. 3368-69) . If he was so willing to ignore an order of court 
entered in his presence, the court, like Dr. Stewart, could 
appropriately find he would manipulate test results in a test with 
which he was familiar. 
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Andrew takes the position before this Court, that the 
trial court was required to believe that Susan, rather than 
himself, based solely on her MMPI profile, would be manipulative. 
However, that is, directly contrary to the evidence presented, that 
is the actions of the parties as described and evaluated in the 
findings. Dr. Stewart explained that the mother's profile was 
valid and useable (R. 2311). It was consistent with her clinical 
observations. (R. 2316) . She testified that Andrew was insisting 
on an absolute reading of the mother's profile, but that was not 
the proper way to read it; it had to be read based on the moderator 
variables, that is what had actually happened in the mother's life. 
(R. 2312-14, 2392-2406) . She also observed that the mother was not 
a person who would think carefully about maximizing her position. 
(R. 2340) . 
Dr. Stewart felt it was appropriate to use the 
information from the MMPI in context, not as an absolute. She felt 
it was necessary that it be evaluated consistently with her 
experience in a custody case context as opposed to a clinical 
setting. Andrew asserts the court's acceptance of this evidence 
is an abuse of discretion. It is not. This is a situation where 
his version of the evidence was not accepted - Susan's was. That 
is not an abuse of discretion. That is the trial court carrying 
out its function of fact finding. As the Utah Supreme Court has 
held, " [w] hen there is a discrepancy in testimony rendered by the 
witnesses, the fact finder must decide which account is the most 
accurate." Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530, 531 (Utah 1979). See 
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also Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 626 (Utah App. 1993) ("When 
acting as the fact-finder, the trial court is entitled to assess 
the witnesses and to weigh the evidence and draw reasonable 
inferences therefrom"). Yelderman v. Yelderman, supra, Nilson v. 
Nilson, supra. 
Andrew asserted and tried to establish that Susan was 
having trouble in handling Will. The evidence conflicted on this 
point. Dr. Stewart testified that Will's conduct of becoming 
anxious before returning to his mother, was a very normal behavior 
which is consistently seen in a divorce where children are passing 
from one parent to the other. (R. 3118-19) . In rejecting Andrew's 
assertions and testimony, the court was appropriately fact finding, 
not abusing in its discretion. 
Finally, a challenge is made to Dr. Stewart's ex-parte 
communication with Plaintiff's counsel. The challenge is not 
candidly presented to the Court. Dr. Stewart testified that she 
talked to both counsel for Susan and counsel for Andrew (R. 2244-
45). She related that attorneys regularly provide information to 
her this way in custody cases. (R. 2246-47) She testified it is 
not unusual for counsel to contact her and such contacts do not 
influence her, they simply provide her with more information and 
the more information she can receive, the better she can evaluate 
the information that she has. (R. 2253). She further explained 
this by advising the trial court that she did not see herself as an 
expert for one side or the other, she will work with either 
counsel. She is an expert who provides information to the trial 
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court as she sees it. (R. 3130-31). 
Andrew claims Finding 13, which provides: 
While Defendant clearly loves all the 
children and has a great deal to offer these 
children, the court finds that he is not 
equally bonded to the three children. Dr. 
Stewart clearly opined the Plaintiff would 
make the better custodial parent for the three 
children and is strongly and equally bonded to 
all three. The Court finds this testimony to 
be credible. 
is not supported by any evidence. This Finding is supported by 
Exhibit "1" and the testimony of Dr. Stewart. (R.2376-79, 2382, 
3121-23). 
Finding 14, which is challenged by Andrew provides: 
The court was advised by Dr. Stewart that 
she is very concerned when one parent 
alienates children from the other parent. She 
found, and the court has determined from the 
testimony of the parties and their conduct in 
court that Dr. Stewart correctly observed that 
the Defendant works to alienate the children 
from the Plaintiff by fault finding, criticism 
and derogatory comments. On the other hand, 
the Plaintiff does not engage in this 
behavior. 
This Finding is supported by Susan's testimony (R. 2870) and Dr. 
Stewart's testimony (Exhibit "1", 2261-63-2265-68, 2277-82, 2321-
23, 2324, 3098-99, 3102-03). Andrew again challenges this finding 
but fails to cite to the evidence which supports it and presents 
only his criticism without first examining all the evidence 
presented. 
Finding 15 which provides: 
The Court found the defendant's testimony 
concerning the Park City outing to be 
particularly significant in this context. 
When defendant, en route to Park City, 
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experienced problems with his vehicle, he 
walks in distance in the sun/heat with the 
children, decided to keep the children with 
him overnight and chose not to call the 
plaintiff directly to seek assistance with the 
children, or to advise her of where he and the 
children were and what his plans were. 
is supported by Andrew's testimony (R. 3033-44, 3383-84). No 
attempt is made to marshall or analyze the evidence supporting this 
finding. 
Finding 16 which provides: 
The 911 tape was considered compelling by 
the Court. The content and the tone of the 
tape reflected an alarming degree of 
persistence, angry demands, intense poundings 
on the doors, and chaos, at the home, to which 
the children were insensitively subjected. 
While both parents might well have handled 
this situation differently, keeping the best 
interest of the children at the forefront of 
their minds, it is particularly clear that the 
defendant lost control and forgot what was 
best for the children. 
is supported by Exhibit 31. There is, in addition, testimony about 
what occurred by Dr. Stewart (R. 226567) and Susan (R. 2526-27, 
2832-36) . There is also the discussion of this tape between the 
trial court and counsel on the record (R. 2823-2825, 2826-27, 2906-
08, Exhibit "31"). Andrew's testimony conveyed his explanation. 
It also demonstrated that he did not consider the impact of what he 
was doing on either Susan or children. The position expressed in 
his brief (P. 34-35) underlines the validity of the court's 
determination. 
Finding 17, which provides: 
Defendant acknowledged, while on the stand, 
that the plaintiff has been flexible regarding 
visitation in the past. 
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is supported not only by Andrew's testimony (R. 3022, 3375-76), but 
also by Dr. Stewart (R. 2351-52). 
Finding 18 which provides: 
Dr. Stewart described the difference 
between playing with and entertaining the 
children as opposed to providing every day 
structure and care. She testified that the 
structure a care giver would give would 
produce more resistance from a child than 
would simply playing with the child, yet this 
care giver providing structure would be 
providing more attention to the children than 
someone who simply played with the children. 
The Plaintiff is aware of the problems that 
arise from her providing structure for the 
children. The Defendant, not providing this 
type of structure, does not encounter this 
type of difficulty. The Plaintiff provides 
limits for the children and this produces 
conflicts. The Defendant does not. Instead 
of recognizing that this is a problem, the 
Defendant simply criticizes the Plaintiff to 
the children, which is a de-stabilizing factor 
in their lives. The lack of this criticism in 
the home of Mrs. Baldwin is one of the 
stabilizing factors in the children's lives as 
it leaves them free to form an unfettered 
relationship with their father. Dr. Baldwin 
does not permit the children this freedom in 
their relationship with Mrs. Baldwin. This 
conduct by Dr. Baldwin is detrimental to the 
children. 
is supported by the testimony of Dr. Stewart (R. 2261-63, 2269-72, 
2276-77, 2277-82, 2293-96, 2356-57, 2378-79, 2382, 3103-08), Susan 
(R. 2516, 2531, 2870), and Andrew (R. 3195-98). Again, the 
evidence supporting this Finding is not marshalled. Andrew simply 
recites his contrary evidence, primarily his testimony and fails to 
demonstrate any abuse of discretion by the trial court in rejecting 
the evidence offered by him while accepting the evidence presented 
by Susan. 
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Finding 19 provides: 
Will is strongly bonded with both 
parents. Andrew and Barbara have strong 
bonding with the Plaintiff and weak bonding 
with the Defendant. The Defendant has not 
demonstrated an ability to provide care and 
supervision in a suitable environment for the 
children and meet their needs for a prolonged 
period of time. The Plaintiff has 
demonstrated an ability to provide care and 
supervision in a suitable environment for the 
children and meet their needs throughout their 
lives. 
it is supported by the testimony of both Dr. Stewart (R. 2268-72, 
2342-44, 3121-23) and Susan (R. 2882-83). Disingenuously, Andrew 
in footnote 24, states that Dr. Stewart admitted she was not at 
that moment able to make a finding or observation, based on the 
long interval between her evaluation and the trial. However, no 
evidence to the contrary is offered by a conflicting professional 
opinion though Andrew was offered the opportunity of a second 
opinion and an update by Dr. Stewart. An opportunity he rejected. 
Finding 2 0 which provides: 
The Defendant attempted to involve Will 
in the custodial dispute. He has advised Will 
that he (Will) will be placed in the 
Defendant's custody, thus trying to impact 
Will's preference for which parent he would 
reside. The Plaintiff has engaged in no such 
activity. This activity is considered to be 
seriously detrimental to Will. 
is supported by the testimony of Dr. Stewart, (R. 2261-63-,2268, 
2277-82, 2321-23, 3109-10), Susan (R. 2560-76, 2827-30), and Andrew 
(R. 3028-29) . What Andrew fails to acknowledge is that the state 
of the mind of the child, can establish that the child feels he is 
being placed in the middle of a custodial dispute. However, that 
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is not the only evidence in support of this finding. There is the 
testimony of Dr. Stewart, as well as the testimony of Andrew 
himself, as cited above. 
Finding 21 provides: 
The law favors keeping siblings together. 
The Defendant initially wanted custody of Will 
but not Barbara or Andy. His position changed 
only as he went into trial, apparently after 
determining that he would not be able to 
successfully secure a separation of the 
children. These three children should be kept 
together in a family unit. The Plaintiff has 
sought custody of all three children 
throughout this action and has constantly 
maintained the position that the children 
should be kept together in a family unit. 
This is supported by pleadings submitted by Andrew (R. 34, 43, 53, 
58-59, 74, 117-18, 135-36, 146-49, 182-84, 221-22, 2172-173), as 
well as testimony of Dr. Stewart (R. 2281-82, 2354-59) and Exhibit 
"1". Interestingly enough, Andrew himself testified in trial that 
this finding is true, though he does not acknowledge the impact of 
this testimony. In the hearing on January 10, 1994, Andrew 
testified that in reality, he wanted Susan to raise Barbara and 
Andy until they reach school age and then he would assume physical 
custody for the school year. He would do the same for Will as soon 
as Will was ready to start school. (R. 3213-14, 3343-44) . This, 
in fact, separates the children, as they are not triplets and will 
not all reach school age at the same time. While he denies that 
this is true, his own pleadings and testimony establish the 
validity of the court's determination. 
Finding 22 is challenged by Andrew. It is: 
Dr. Stewart advised the court that she 
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found the character and emotional stability of 
Susan Baldwin as a custodial parent, greatly 
exceeded that of Andrew Baldwin. No credible 
contrary evidence was presented to the court. 
The court finds that Susan Baldwin has, in 
terms of her character and her emotional 
stability for providing custodial care for the 
children, emotional stability and an ability 
to provide an emotionally stable environment 
which greatly exceeds that of the Defendant. 
The evidence which supports this, is not only Exhibit "1", but the 
testimony of Dr. Stewart in several places not cited by Andrew in 
his challenge to this finding. (R. 2261-63, 2268-72, 2276-77, 
2293-96, 2342-44, Exhibit "1", 3131-36). Again, Andrew believes 
this Court must overturn the finding simply because there is 
contrary evidence. There is no effort to marshall the evidence in 
support of the court's finding, just a challenge to it. 
Finding 23, provides: 
The Plaintiff has demonstrated throughout 
the lives of the children a major commitment 
to custodial parenting. The Defendant has 
engaged in a playmate role with his son Will 
but not even that with the other children. 
While the Plaintiff returned to work on a part 
time basis after the birth of the children, 
the Defendant worked full time and utilized 
his spare time to conduct research for the 
publication of articles rather than assisting 
with the children. In addition, the Defendant 
was, until trial, perfectly willing, and in 
fact, requested the court to separate the 
children. The desire and commitment for 
custody is clearly differentiated between the 
parties. The Plaintiff has sought custody of 
all the children throughout these pleadings, 
while the Defendant does not. In fact he 
advised the court in his January 10, 1994 
testimony that he in reality wanted the 
Plaintiff to raise Barbara and Andy until they 
reached school age and then he would assume 
physical custody. 
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It is supported by the pleadings (R. 34, 43, 53, 58-59, 74, 117-18, 
135-36, 146-49, 182-84, 221-22, 2172-173), as well as the testimony 
of Dr. Stewart (R. 2342-44, 2354-59, 2376-79, 2382, 3079) and 
Andrew (R. 3213-14, 3343-44). Andrew's challenge to this finding 
is simply a failure to acknowledge that he meant what he said in 
his pleadings to the court, in his statements to Dr. Stewart, and 
his testimony to the trial court on January 10, 1994 (R. 3213-14, 
3343-44). 
Finding 24 which provides: 
The Defendant on several occasions 
created scenes that were emotionally 
disturbing to the children. He physically 
took the children from the Plaintiff in 
January of 1993 when Plaintiff did not agree 
to that visitation and attempted to take them 
again without her agreement in June, 1993. 
Prior to the filing of the divorce, he ran his 
bicycle into the family car, then told Will 
(untruthfully) , who was in the car driven by 
the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff had hurt him 
and that he had to go to the hospital. Even 
the Defendant's own witnesses testified that 
this was totally inappropriate behavior. 
is supported by the testimony of Dr. Stewart (R. 2265-68, 2288, 
2324, 3119-20, Exhibit "1"), Dr. Goldsmith (R. 2439-42, 2470-74), 
Susan (R. 2523-28, 2827-30), and Dr. Susan Mirow, a witness offered 
by Andrew (R. 2805, 2808, 2812). In his challenge, Andrew fails to 
recognize that credibility is one of the factors utilized by the 
trial court in making its findings. 
Finding 25, which provides: 
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The Defendant refused to consider the 
problems that Will suffers which have been 
diagnosed by competent medical and 
psychological professionals to be Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. The Defendant 
insists this does not exist, and went to great 
lengths to prove that this did not exist 
before the court. This has placed Will in the 
position of receiving input from one parent 
that there is a problem with which he must 
deal, while the other parent denies that it 
exists. The need of a child suffering from 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder is 
for stability, predictability, and consistency 
in their environment. The Plaintiff is 
capable of providing this environment. The 
Defendant is not. The Defendant has 
demonstrated an inability to accept this 
diagnosis. From the court's perception, this 
is not an issue the court is going to decide, 
nor need it decide it in terms of reaching a 
factual determination. It does not decide 
whether or not Will suffers from Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. What the 
court does find, is that the Plaintiff after 
consulting with appropriate medical and 
psychological experts, determined that a 
problem existed and followed the professional 
advice she received in caring for Will. 
Instead of working with Plaintiff (the parent 
having temporary custody) the Defendant 
actively undermined and opposed the prescribed 
treatment thus demonstrating a desire to place 
his own wishes ahead of the best interest of 
his children even after consulting Dr. Frances 
Berger who tentatively confirmed the diagnosis 
and tried to counsel the Defendant about his 
reaction to this information. 
is supported by Dr. Stewart (R. 2270-75, 2318-21, 2323, 3107-08), 
the declarations of the trial court which provided guidance to the 
parties (R. 2855, 3210), Dr. Goldsmith (R. 2535-47, 2462-64, 2468-
75, 2477-79, 2481-82), Susan (R. 2487-89, 2580-84), Dr. Frances 
Berger (R. 2895-2906) , and Andrew (R. 3204-09) . 
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In his challenge to this finding, Andrew offered the 
testimony of Dr. Delbert Goates. However, Dr. Goates testified 
that he never saw the children, just the tapes (R. 3262), did not 
see the deposition of Dr. Frances Berger (R. 3272) , did not see the 
report of Dr. Douglas Goldsmith (R. 3272), that, he himself, has 
placed children as young as two on medication (R. 3276), that he 
knows and respects the work of Dr. Frances Berger and would 
consider her opinion important regarding a finding of hyperactivity 
(R. 3 3 07), that he considers Dr. Douglas Goldsmith knowledgeable 
regarding hyperactivity and would consider his opinion important 
(R. 33 07) and it is important that Dr. Goldsmith was unwilling to 
start treatment because Susan and Andrew disagreed (R. 3310), which 
information was not given to him. (R. 3310) . In addition, Dr. 
Goates was not told that Will had his own therapist. (R. 3311). 
In other words, highly significant information was not given to Dr. 
Goates. Once again Andrew fails to consider that when testimony is 
in conflict, it is not an abuse of discretion to choose which 
testimony to accept. Yelderman v. Yelderman, supra, Nilson v. 
Nilson, supra. 
The trial court made it clear throughout the trial that 
a determination of whether or not Will was hyperactive was not the 
issue, the issue was whether or not a parent was ignoring or 
rejecting competent medical opinions. 
Finally, a series of evidentiary rulings are packaged 
together by Andrew as asserted in error. First, he claims that 
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Strassberg was not allowed to testify that Dr. Stewart's rejection 
of the parties' MMPI profiles were not consistent with the 
psychological profession. As is pointed out infra. Dr. Strassberg 
had never seen either party, and therefore did not have a 
foundational basis on which to offer an opinion in this case. 
Furthermore, when the trial is to the court, 
his rulings on evidence need not be subjected 
to quite such critical scrutiny as when it is 
to the jury, because in arriving at his 
conclusions upon the issues he will include in 
his consideration of them his knowledge and 
his judgment as to the competing materiality 
and effect of evidence. 
In Re Baxter's Estate, 399 P.2d 442, 445 (Utah 1965). 
Andrew then asserts that his inability to answer a 
question was the basis of the court's finding against him. That is 
not correct. The findings in support of Andrew's "playing with" as 
opposed to "parenting" the children are discussed in regard to 
finding 18. The offered testimony was repetitive of his testimony. 
The trial court appropriately refused to consider 
evidence regarding the alleged "witness tampering". The court 
carefully explained its rulings (R. 3186-3190) pointing out that 
Andrew was attempting to introduce evidence on a matter which 
should have been considered in either a criminal context or a 
contempt context, not in the context of the divorce trial. The 
trial court appropriately exercised its discretion in that ruling 
to control the scope of the trial. 
In sum, the trial court appropriately carried out its 
function of fact finder. In doing so, it resolved, conflicting 
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testimony and evidence. Yelderman v. Yelderman, supra, Nilson v. 
Nilson, supra. In applying the appropriate standard of review, it 
is clear that the challenged findings must be shown to be an abuse 
of discretion. There is no abuse of discretion. In this case, 
Andrew has merely shown that there is testimony conflicts with the 
finding of the court. He has failed to marshall the evidence that 
supports the challenged findings. The marshalled evidence reveals 
that the trial court appropriately exercised its fact finding 
discretion. Andrew ignores the issue of credibility. He fails to 
evaluate the factor that all admitted evidence is not of equal 
weight. The trial court made detailed findings which fully support 
the award of custody to Susan. In doing so, the trial court 
followed and applied the criteria as articulated by the 
legislature, judicial council, and Appellate courts of this state. 
Those findings and the ruling should be affirmed. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
In the court below, the mother was awarded attorney's 
fees as she was found to be in need of financial assistance for 
having to litigate this matter. When this Court affirms the trial 
court, the matter should then be remanded for an award of those 
attorney's fees and costs she has incurred on appeal. Hall v. 
Hall, 855 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993). 
SUMMARY AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in 
sifting and weighing contrasting and conflicting evidence. It 
entered findings of fact which show a careful, thorough examination 
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of the factors it should consider in reaching a decision in a 
contested custody case. Andrew challenges those findings but fails 
to marshall the evidence supporting them in presenting his 
challenge. The sufficiency of the findings is not challenged. 
Susan seeks a ruling from this Court affirming the trial 
court's award of custody to her and an award of the costs and 
attorney's fees she has incurred in defending this appeal. 
DATED this 7 day of May, 1995. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Counsel for Appellee 
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